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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (3 Feb 67) FOR OT

13 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion

AD 844099

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93rd Military Police Battalion for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

1 Incl
a/s

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
93rd Military Police Battalion
APO San Francisco 96238

AVECP-I

11 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966. Report Control Symbol CSFOA-65

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I A. Significant Activities:

1. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, was activated at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1 June 1966 per General Order 93, HQ'S, USMC, Ft Sill, Oklahoma, for deployment to Vietnam. Original guidance was that all personnel would be Department of the Army fill and personnel would be on station 1 June 1966. Based on this guidance a schedule was developed to ready the unit for overseas movement in the shortest possible time. Recommended personnel readiness date was 25 July 1966.

2. All personnel spaces below the grade of E-5 were filled by privates directly from Advanced Individual Training. All non-commissioned officers were brought from long tour overseas areas and had Department of the Army Orders with reporting dates of 15 June 1966. Department of the Army set the personnel readiness date back to August to compensate for late arrival of non-commissioned officers from overseas commands. With one exception all Officer positions were filled from CONUS stations.

3. Space was at premium at Fort Sill but this unit experienced no major housekeeping problems. The first week of the cycle was devoted to renovating the Headquarters building, setting up offices and supply rooms, personnel processing, and generally getting settled. Formal training began 8 June 1966.

4. The unit received its approved organizational crust on 15 June 1966, and the Battalion colors 6 July 1966. Colors were presented to the Battalion Commander by Major General Critz, Commanding General, Fort Sill, at a formal activation ceremony 9 July 1966.

5. Main body departed Fort Sill for ocean shipment 10 August 1966 and the advanced party departed 15 August 1966 by air.

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Inclosure 1

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65

B. Schedule of Training, Operations, and Movement:

1. Army training program 19-1 required a total of 60 hours for this Headquarters. A total of 155 hours was actually conducted. This consisted of additional weapons training and firing (to include individual weapons, not organic to TOE but commonly used in Vietnam), by extra training in communications, physical security, and intelligence training. Since a formal Army training test was not required or practical due to the lack of support units, the Battalion Commander conducted Command Post Exercises to train personnel in staff procedures and functions. The added training was in response to the stated desires of the Commanding Officers, 16th Military Police Group and 18th Military Police Brigade in correspondence with the Battalion Commander before official activation. The objective was to insure that personnel of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment were as fully prepared for in-country soldiering as time would allow.

2. A Battalion reading program was prescribed for all Officers and non-commissioned Officers which included all applicable Army Regulations, Field and Technical Manuals, and other available material to anticipated missions and duties in Vietnam. While this reading required many hours of reading after long duty days, it was completed prior to deployment and contributed considerable to staff development.

3. Classroom training was normally held to half day schedules, the remainder of the day being devoted to operations, individual section training, maintenance and preparation of equipment for overseas movement. Formal training during this cycle was further augmented by observation of outstanding field demonstrations and special instruction presented by the Artillery School.

4. The Detachment completed formal training 16 July 1966, and began final packing and crating. Majority of personnel began leave 23 July 1966, and others remained on duty to ship equipment and accomplish other last minute actions.

C. Major Difficulties and Command Actions Taken:

1. a. This Headquarters received no communication before deployment from the theater, to include the host unit. It was assumed that units would be joined in-country. The mission was unknown, working and living conditions were unknown. No publications were available from the theater on which to base planning, Standard Operating Procedures, to anticipate special requirements, or to emphasize special subjects in the training program.

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b. The assumption was made that mission would probably be one of security, however, reference material was gathered for, plans were based upon, and training was geared to possibility of other missions such as prisoners of war, town patrol, traffic control, road patrol, and general maintenance of discipline, law, and order.

2. a. Inadequate TOE: TOE 10-500D is woefully inadequate in vehicles, tentage, generators, light sets, radios and telephone equipment. It does not provide sufficient personnel for personnel administration or operations and provides no communications or maintenance capability. Headquarters of this type cannot effectively operate in Vietnam without personnel and equipment augmentation. The new 19-500E suffers this same shortcoming.

b. Augmentation of equipment was requested upon activation in CONUS without regard to future mission or area of assignment. The Headquarters had no information or guidance from overseas theater on which to base specific justification and the request was disapproved by COMUSARV even though the Commanding Generals of the Artillery and Missile Center, and Fourth US Army recommended augmentation approval as a priority action. The staff at Fort Sill even increased the original request of this unit in critical areas (vehicles, tents, radios, generators, etc.) based on their personal knowledge of conditions in-country. COMUSARV was adamant in their disapproval however, based on USARV guidance that "units would arrive in-country with TOE authorized even though it was austere". (The Battalion Commander not believing this was true, personally contacted a friend in Vietnam and was informed that this is true and that USARV would not approve any augmentation for new units.) It was therefore necessary to borrow, to improvise, and to attach personnel upon arrival in country in order to become fully operational.

c. As a request for modification to TOE was being prepared TOE 19-500E was received. Request for MTOE has been slightly revised and is being held pending receipt of general orders placing the Headquarters under the new TOE. The revised TOE in no way gives this unit the personnel, vehicles, and other equipment necessary to carry out required personnel administration, intelligence, and operational functions in this theater of operations.

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3. Late Arrival of Equipment: a. No conexes were authorized this Headquarters for Rod disk TAT upon deployment. Upon reoclama, one conex was authorized which was inadequate. Further bulk shipment which was scheduled to arrive 3 September 1966, 3 days after the main body, did not arrive until 47 days later.

b. This headquarters asked for and received its first assigned unit 7 days after arrival in-country and was fully operational 16 days after arrival. This was accomplished by borrowing equipment, fabricating chairs and tables, and by the judicious use of the little space allowed in Rod Disk TAT in packing before deployment from CONUS.

c. This Headquarters received numerous reports of location or status of the ship carrying our equipment, all generally being wrong as it developed. It was impossible to determine the location of the ship through normal channels or whether our equipment was actually on it. Status of equipment and location were accurately determined when the Battalion Commander appealed to a senior Officer, who was an old friend.

4. Lack of Construction and Barrier Material: a. No WABTOC package was authorized this Headquarters as it was a Detachment and packages were authorized on a basis of one per company. While in CONUS this was not considered a major problem as we anticipated being located with a subordinate established unit with adequate equipment. Information from the theater or host unit would have given cause for concern. Upon arrival in country, this Headquarters was given real estate approximately 5 miles from its sole unit. There was no lumber, screening, sandbags, barrier or construction material available.

b. Upon arrival of advanced party tents were borrowed and lumber, nails, and a water tank were procured in order to pitch and frame tents and to construct a makeshift shower for the arrival of the main body. In spite of the inadequate supply system, the lack of WABTOC items and the complete lack of engineer support this Detachment is living comfortably in framed and screened tents on concrete pads. This Headquarters is settled in a wood framed building, two buildings for billets, a mess hall, a latrine, a shower and latrines have been constructed. A large personnel bunker has been completed using sandbagged sand filled drums. All tents are sandbagged and perimeter positions have been established. A combination gate house and bunker has been completed at the entrance to the cantonment area.

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c. It is important to note that though the aforementioned supply and equipment shortages would have made this unit's mission easier to accomplish, the fact that combat units deserve first and absolute priority is recognized and fully accepted. The motto of the 93rd Military Police Battalion (Support Combat) is not considered in thought or action to be simply two words among unit slogans. Many Officers and men of this Battalion have combat experience and fully appreciate the fact that the best and the most of available supplies must go to the divisions. On the other hand, if adequate supplies above and beyond combat unit needs are available for support units (as they appear to be throughout Vietnam) we intend to actively seek our fair share.

SECTION II. Part I. Lessons Learned:

A. Personnel Administration:

Publications

Item 1. Lack of reference publications upon arrival in country.

Discussion: On arrival in country this unit experienced extreme difficulty in obtaining reference publications of major commands in country. This resulted in difficulties in becoming operational and complying with reports and other requirements. It hampers the Headquarters ability to plan and anticipate requirements before deployment.

Observation: A complete set of directives and publications should be sent to deploying units as soon as possible at their home station.

Blank Forms

Item 2. Lead time for blank forms requisition for units now in country.

Discussion: Lead time for requisitions for blank forms outside the Saigon area is from 40 to 60 days. This Headquarters first requisition is 58 days old and has not yet been filled. Further, most blank forms were shipped in bulk shipment which failed to arrive until over a month and one half after the main body arrived.

Observation: A minimum of at least 90 days supply of blank forms should be brought with deploying units. A 30 day supply should be carried TAT.

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SECTION II, Part I, Lessons Learned

B. Operations:Planning DataItem 1. Lack of planning information prior to deployment.

Discussion: This Headquarters did not receive any communication from this theater prior to deployment. Due to this lack of information the Headquarters had to make many assumptions as to missions, operational problems and living conditions. This resulted in improper use of planning time prior to deployment.

Observation: Timely assignment of mission and information from sponsoring unit as to living conditions and operational environment received by deploying units while still in CONUS would make deployment more smooth and would expedite becoming operational upon arrival in country.

Merchant SeamenItem 2. Conduct of Merchant Seamen.

Discussion: Military Policemen at port activities have difficulty with merchant seamen who consider themselves immune to any authority. Most common offenses are drunk and disorderly.

Observation: Merchant seamen should be aware of their responsibilities and the authority of various police agencies in the Republic of Vietnam.

C. Training and Organization:SafetyItem 1. Firearms safety.

Discussion: There is a tendency for newly arrived personnel to be somewhat nervous and overanxious to resort to use of firearms in relatively secure or overpopulated areas, frequently resulting in injury to innocent persons.

Observation: All personnel arriving in country should be thoroughly indoctrinated on when and under what circumstances to resort to use of firearms. This instruction must go beyond the point of simply reading and issuing written instructions. Guidance should be thoroughly explained to include examples of when and when not to fire. This should be regularly reviewed with all personnel.

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SECTION II, Part I, Lessons Learned:

Weapons Training

Item 2. Familiarization with non-TOE weapons.

Discussion: Frequently combat support and combat service support units or replacements arrive in country only having fired their basic weapon or the weapons organic to the TOE. Many of these personnel are placed on duty in perimeter defense which requires knowledge of automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and the use of flares.

Observation: All deploying units should concentrate on weapons proficiency not only of the weapon with which the individual is armed but with other weapons commonly used in Vietnam.

Field Fortifications

Item 3. Extensive training in field fortifications.

Discussion: Units deploying to Vietnam are faced with immediate requirement for constructing field fortifications. In combat service support units training in field fortifications is frequently not emphasized.

Observation: All units deploying to Vietnam should undergo extensive training in field fortifications.

Maintenance

Item 4. Emphasis in maintenance training.

Discussion: Deploying units normally are not initially faced with maintenance problems because of normally being issued new or rebuilt vehicles. The tendency is to underemphasize maintenance training during preparation for deployment.

Observation: Commanders of deploying units must establish a strong maintenance program and give it great emphasis from the outset in order to establish the importance of good maintenance. Commanders must insure that maintenance is not relegated to a position of secondary importance to operational commitments.

D. Intelligence: None

E. Logistics:

Port Call

Item 1. Lack of timely unit port call.

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SECTION II, Part I, Lessons Learned:

Discussion: Due to administrative error the port call for this Headquarters was sent to Presidio, California rather than Fort Sill. This necessitated holding some personnel from POM leave in order to accomplish final packing, crating, and shipping equipment on very short notice. Port call was finally received after repeated queries by this Headquarters.

Observation: If timely port calls are not received in accordance with the deployment schedule, units and sponsoring installation should exhaust every means to determine status of port call.

Issue of Equipment

Item 2. Last minute receipt of equipment for deploying units.

Discussion: Local policy provided for lateral transfer of POE equipment ordered but not received. These transfers were not approved however, until hours before equipment was to be shipped. This resulted in additional workload for the deploying unit in processing paperwork and accomplishing the transaction without sufficient time.

Observation: Cut off dates should be established sufficiently in advance of shipping date to allow sufficient time for orderly lateral transfer of equipment.

Supply Accounts

Item 3. AT/YT numbers.

Discussion: If a unit received its AT/YT number prior to deployment requisitions could be submitted for shortages and immediately upon arrival in country unit could establish supply account. This would eliminate the 30 to 60 day period of lost time presently experienced in awaiting these numbers after arrival in country. Further, this would tend to discourage stop-gap supply measures which circumvent the supply system.

Observation: Units should be assigned AT/YT numbers prior to deployment.

Equipment Security

Item 4. Unloading Equipment.

Discussion: When equipment for this unit arrived in port unit personnel went on watch at the port and observed all offloading until such time as all unit equipment had been received. Other units not following this practice reported missing equipment.

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SECTION II, Part I, Lessons Learned:

Observation: Every effort must be made to insure that equipment is not misplaced or stolen when it is offloaded from the ship.

Issue of Equipment

Item 5. Unit deployment at less than 100% TOE and T.. equipment.

Discussion: This unit had shortages of T1 equipment which was on a ship-to-port requisition with estimated date of delivery of less than 30 days after arrival of unit in country. Unit has not received any of these items almost three months after arrival in country.

Observation: Supply personnel in CONUS should closely monitor overseas supply system and strive to accurately advise deploying units. Every effort should be made to deploy units at full 100% TOE and T.. equipment.

Special Allowances

Item 6. Special equipment allowances.

Discussion: Units deployed to Vietnam find that there are many items available to support their mission such as pedestal mounts, vehicle armor kits, perimeter lighting, and additional weapons and equipment for perimeter defense. If this information were available to units prior to deployment, it would aid in planning and would expedite procurement of these items by timely submission of requisitions.

Observation: If a complete set of publications from appropriate Headquarters were distributed before deployment the above problem would be solved.

SECTION II, Part II, Recommendations:**1. PERSONNEL:**

1. That a comprehensive fact sheet be developed for the use of individual personnel on planning for their tour of duty in Vietnam and that this sheet be made available to each and every unit activating or preparing to deploy to this country early enough to be included in their Command Information Program.

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SECTION II, Part II, Recommendations:

2. That maximum attention be given to the welcoming of all new units as a matter of command policy (directive) whether the unit happens to be a small detachment, a company, or a division. (Note: Basically, a unit and the personnel in it need to feel, upon arrival, that they are welcome, needed, and that they are important. A little fanfare in this field is entirely within the capabilities of all units.)

B. OPERATIONS:

1. That units be given more than 15 days to become operational (report requirements, etc.) until receipt of the equipment can be accomplished.

C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

1. That major installation commanders or Army Commanders be given the authority to augment units destined for Vietnam in key areas (communications, weapons, vehicles, tactics,) based on the experience of their staff and the justification submitted by the unit commander concerned.

2. That the so-called "Vietnam Orientation" in the Zone of Interior, usually consisting of two days orientation including a one-half day ambush problem, be enlarged beyond ambush, sanitation and associated subjects. The above is considered vital to be sure, but the technical aspects of the Vietnam environment are also important, i.e. techniques and functioning of the supply system, organization of the US Army in Vietnam, and the different environment in the major area in country.

D. INTELLIGENCE: None.

E. LOGISTICS:

1. That supply account numbers be assigned to incoming units PRIOR TO THEIR ARRIVAL in order that unit advance parties can function in their capacity of providing for the main body.

2. That a supply fact sheet (in detail and covering procedures, critical items, the system in being) be provided to all unit commanders as soon after activation or notification of displacement as possible.

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SECTION II, Part II, Recommendations

3. That emergency motor pools be established to allow incoming unit to have adequate transportation which they can utilize until their own TOS equipment is in country (this is the single most important recommendation made by the unit).

4. That an emergency communications pool be established which incoming units can draw on and utilize until their own organic resources are available, actually in their hands, and in operation. (Note: This is the second most important recommendation in this report and is based on the observation that the telephone communications in Vietnam are the worst possible standard which could ever be set as a MINIMUM STANDARD. This includes not only telephone communications from Saigon to outlying areas and return, but even within local areas themselves. Several men are normally tied up nearly full time trying to get through to a higher command).

5. That sole-user circuits be authorized and IMMEDIATELY INSTALLED between major units (Battalions, Groups, Brigades) as an urgent and immediate need to accomplish the desired standard of organizational and operational response.

6. That a system be established (and monitored) to keep units informed on the whereabouts of their equipment (and location of the ship it is on) and conex container, particularly when it is about to be offloaded. (Note: This unit "found" one of our conex's on the dock at Qui Nhon only by virtue of the fact that considerable manpower was expended on checking and rechecking of incoming items on a daily basis. We had no knowledge that this conex was even separated from the main lot and in fact, at the time, had no idea whatsoever where our ship, conexes or vehicles were.)

7. That Report of Lessons Learned be disseminated to all units down to and including Battalions and separate companies prior to overseas shipment to Vietnam.

William E. Daniels
WILLIAM E. DANIELS
LTC MPC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Five (5) to CO, 16th MP Gp
- 2 - One (1) CINCPAC-RPLC ATTN: GPOP-RH
- 3 - Three (3) DCG, USARV ATTN: AVC-DH

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
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Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, APO 96240, 23 November 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D. C. 20310

1. The Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 of the 93d Military Police Battalion is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. I feel that this report is generally adequate and the recommendations valid. A summarization and specific comments regarding areas of nonconcence are contained in the following paragraphs. All comments are keyed to specific sections, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the basic report.

a. (Section I, para C1a, b) The 93d Military Police Battalion was assigned to the 16th Military Police Group on 26 September 1966. No official relationship existed between these units prior to that date. However, information had been received from USARV and OPMG that probably this battalion would be assigned to this headquarters after arrival in RVN.

b. (Section I, para C2a, c) TOE 19-500S is inadequate for the mission assigned to this battalion. Action has been initiated to submit an MTOE for battalion headquarters.

c. (Section II, para A, Items 1 & 2) The battalion complied with the provisions of paragraphs 82 and 84, AR 310-1, and USARV Regulation 310-3, regarding the requisition of publications and blank forms. The initial distribution procedures described by para 44, USARV Pamphlet 1-1 were not accomplished. Follow-up action is being taken by the unit and this headquarters to obtain forms and publications.

d. (Section II, Part I, para B, Item 1) Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, upon becoming operational in RVN, instituted policies to insure that no units assigned to this organization would be inadequately sponsored. When authority is granted to communicate with a newly assigned unit still in CONUS, all necessary information consistent with security requirements will be furnished as a matter of policy.

e. (Section II, Part I, para E, Item 5) I agree that every effort should be made to deploy units with complete TOE and TA equipment. It is further recommended that if POM equipment requisitions cannot be filled within thirty days after the unit's arrival in country, the unit should receive timely notification in order to permit a resubmission of requisitions to fill shortages.

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f. (Section II, Part II, para A1) Concur. The suggestion has merit and a fact sheet would be a valuable tool to commanders for conducting RVN orientations. To produce one fact sheet which would apply to all units and still be comprehensive is considered impractical. This information would be more cogent if supplied by the sponsoring unit.

g. (Section II, Part II, para A2) Concur. However, the degree of welcome with which a new unit is received is a matter of command peremptive limited only by imagination and available resources.

h. (Section II, Part II, para B1) Nonconcur. The amount of time required for a given unit to become operational after its arrival in RVN varies with its organization, assigned mission, and the ready availability of critical items of equipment.

i. (Section II, Part II, para C1) Nonconcur. Installation and CONUS Army Commanders are not normally in a position to have detailed, specific and complete information available on which to base an authorization for TOE equipment augmentation of units alerted for RVN. Contact between the gaining in-country command and the alerted unit, when authorized, would provide a more realistic basis for justification of any requests for augmentation to TOE equipment.

j. (Section II, Part II, para C2) Concur. The orientation conducted for personnel alerted for RVN should be the subject of continual monitoring, updating, and improvement. Wherever possible, it should be expanded to incorporate the organization of army units, type commands, etc.

k. (Section II, Part II, para E1) Concur. Unit supply account number (AT/MT) codes should be furnished to units prior to their deployment. Further, this information should be furnished to the gaining command, the area support command, and the sponsoring unit. This would greatly assist the advance party in its mission of providing for the main body.

l. (Section II, Part II, para E2) Concur. A supply fact sheet would be a valuable tool for every commander of a unit alerted for assignment to RVN. It should be provided by the sponsoring unit.

m. (Section II, Part II, para E3) Concur. There is a critical shortage of available transportation for newly arrived units. It is virtually nonexistent except by borrowing from other units. Pooling of limited resources at local area command Transportation Motor Pools would prove invaluable to those units awaiting the arrival of their own organic vehicles.

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n. (Section II, Par II, para Eh) Nonconcur. It is recognized that adequate communications is a primary goal of commanders at all levels of command. Although the recommendation to provide pooled communications equipment on-loan to newly arrived units has merit, it is considered to be unrealistic until supplies of equipment of this type are sufficient to meet demands.

o. (Section II, Part II, para E5) Concur. It is realized that the present wire communications systems is overtaxed and is in great need of expansion. A request for certain sole-user wire circuits is presently being prepared for submission by this headquarters.


p. (Section II, Part II, para E6) Concur. The timely notification of each newly arrived unit of the location and ETA of its organizational equipment would provide for accurate operational planning and proper utilization of assigned personnel.

q. (Section II, Part II, para E7) Concur. Reports of Lessons Learned are currently being made available to CCNUS organizations after proper staffing is completed.

3. The Commanding Officer, 93rd Military Police Battalion, has been provided with a copy of this indorsement for his planning and guidance. A thorough explanation of all nonconcurrances has also been provided.

1 Incl
as

LOUIS J. KLEKAS
Colonel MP
Commanding



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81-31-001